In August 2007, Australia experienced its first-ever outbreak of equine influenza, a highly infectious respiratory disease of horses. Although the outbreak spread over a large geographic area it was eradicated within five months following a substantial disease control effort led by Federal and State animal health authorities. Despite its timely control, this large-scale outbreak caused severe impacts on horse owners and industry participants.
Introduction
The first-ever outbreak of equine influenza occurred in Australia in August 2007 affecting more than 70 thousand horses on more than nine thousand premises. The outbreak spread over a large geographic area across two states, in eastern New South Wales (NSW) and south-eastern Queensland (Webster, 2011) . The disease, which has a worldwide distribution and is considered endemic in all but three countries with substantial horse industries including Australia (OIE, 2008) , was contained and eradicated within five months following substantial disease control efforts led by federal and state animal health authorities (Glanville and Christie, 2011) . The disease eradication campaign included movement restrictions, emergency vaccination, enhanced on-farm biosecurity and public awareness.
Despite its timely control, this large-scale outbreak caused severe disruption to horse owners and industry participants, primarily due to movement restrictions, resulting in financial and emotional hardships and psychological distress (Hoare, 2011 , Smyth et al., 2011 , Taylor et al., 2008 . Movement restrictions comprised an initial national horse movement standstill of 72 hours followed by the creation of restricted and controlled zones within the two affected states (NSW and Queensland) (Scott-Orr, 2011) . Additionally, a special restricted area with free internal horse movement was implemented from late September in areas of high horse density and infection in NSW to minimise impacts on business continuity and thereby to ensure greater compliance with the general disease eradication campaign in regions where resource-intense, local disease control was considered unlikely to be effective (EI EISG, 2008 , Scott-Orr, 2011 . The special restricted area was modified in mid October from initially two separate areas to one large special restricted zone extending from Sydney to the Upper Hunter Valley (Figure 1) (Scott-Orr, 2011) .
The emergency vaccination strategy included ring vaccination in a buffer zone around infected areas, targeted vaccination of high-risk enterprises (such as racing precincts) and blanket vaccination within affected areas (Arthur and Suann, 2011, Perkins et al., 2011) . The Australian thoroughbred racing and breeding industries strongly demanded equine influenza vaccination from the start of the outbreak to alleviate business disruption and economic consequences (Arthur and Suann, 2011) , however vaccination was initially delayed because of sourcing and regulation issues for an appropriate vaccine that would allow differentiation of naturally infected from vaccinated animals, in the face of an outbreak.
It is important to understand horse managers' perceptions about the response to this major emergency animal disease outbreak so that compliance with regulations during future outbreaks can be improved. A 2008 study, conducted following successful equine influenza control, showed high horse owner support (73% of 1870) for eradication in the event of future equine influenza incursions (AHIC, 2008) . Additionally, anecdotal accounts of negative experiences associated with the 2007 equine influenza outbreak have recently been documented (Hoare, 2011) . However, no further analyses were conducted in these previous studies and no information is available regarding factors influencing perceptions about the 2007 outbreak management.
Given the large number of equine pursuits in Australia, and disparity among sectors (AHIC, 2011) , it is possible that owners and managers from different sectors could have received different messages during the 2007 outbreak because of different information dissemination methods between sectors. Different sectors may also have different communication and support needs, meaning that varied approaches should be used in an outbreak response (WHO, 2008) . Moreover, different sectors probably experienced different levels of economic losses due to the outbreak. Thus, there might have been differing perceptions of the outbreak control effort between sectors, but no objective information is available about this issue.
This study aimed to describe horse owners'/managers' perceptions of the outbreak management and to identify factors associated with positive and negative perceptions of the outbreak management. The findings from this investigation will enable industry and government to consider horse owners'/managers' responses to equine influenza management whilst preparing for future incursions and will facilitate better communication during potential future outbreaks of exotic infectious equine diseases.
Methods

Questionnaire design, sampling and data handling
A detailed description of the study design is provided elsewhere. Data collected have been analysed separately to investigate factors influencing the spread of equine influenza onto horse premises (Firestone et al., 2011b) and factors associated with the perception of on-farm biosecurity effectiveness (Schemann et al., 2012) . In brief, a total of 270 premises were randomly selected from a dataset of premises supplied by the NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI). All eligible premises were located in the restricted and special restricted areas of NSW designated according to the risk-based zoning system (described in detail in NSW DPI's Equine Influenza Protection Plan (NSW DPI, 2007) ). Horse owners and managers of these premises (just called 'managers' hereafter for brevity) were asked to participate in the study by a personally addressed letter and up to three follow-up telephone calls. Of the 270 premises selected, 38 were deemed ineligible for various reasons (Firestone et al., 2011a) , whilst the managers of another 32 premises declined to participate. The final study size was 200 managers, of which 127 had at least one confirmed case of equine influenza at their premises.
Two trained interviewers (KS and SMF) conducted face-to-face structured interviews with enrolled horse managers between July and October 2009 using a piloted questionnaire. The questionnaire contained a total of 61 questions of which 17 were used in the current analyses. Fifteen of the questions were closed or semi-closed and the remaining two questions were open-ended. The questionnaire was designed to obtain information about demographics of managers, the nature of their involvement with horses, their sources of information about infection control during the 2007 equine influenza outbreak, their horse's equine influenza infection status during the 2007 outbreak and their attitudes towards a potential future outbreak of equine influenza (perceived likelihood, vulnerability and preparedness). The two interviewers piloted the questionnaire together with four horse managers to test questions for ambiguity and to ensure similar method and response recording. The University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee approved the study protocol (07-2009/11840).
All data were entered into a purpose built Microsoft Access 2007 database (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA). Data cleaning and statistical analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software (release 9.2 © 2002-2008, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) unless otherwise indicated.
Outcome variable
The outcome variable used in this study was based on a question asking horse managers to rate the management of the outbreak on a five-point Likert scale: very well managed, well managed, OK managed, poorly managed or very poorly managed. The first and the last two categories of this question were collapsed to create an ordinal outcome variable 'rating of outbreak management' with three categories: well managed ('very well managed' and 'well managed'), adequately managed ('OK managed') and poorly managed ('poorly managed' or 'very poorly managed'). This outcome variable was used in ordinal logistic regression analyses to investigate the association of explanatory variables with horse managers' perceptions of outbreak management.
Explanatory variables
The 31 explanatory variables investigated in this study are related to manager and premises description, sources of infection control information used during the outbreak, outbreak experience and perceptions concerning a potential future equine influenza outbreak. All explanatory variables considered are presented in Table 1 1 . The variables 'age' and 'gender' of manager were considered confounders a priori and hence forced into all models to assess for their confounding effects (Dohoo, 2009) .
Descriptive and univariable analyses
The distributions of explanatory variables were assessed by creating contingency tables for categorical variables and summary statistics for continuous variables (alone and classified by the outcome).
Unconditional associations between each of the explanatory variables and the outcome variable 'rating of outbreak management' were assessed using univariable ordinal logistic regression models, with UniLogistic SAS macro (Dhand, 2010) . Variables with univariable association p-value of <0.20 (based on the likelihood-ratio chi-square test) were checked for missing values and tested for collinearity in pairs by calculating Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ) for pairs of ordinal variables or by performing Pearson chi-square test for other pairs of variables. The assumption of linearity for the single continuous variable ('Number of horses') was assessed by categorising it into quartiles and plotting mid-points of these quartiles against their respective regression coefficients (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) .
Multivariable analyses
Multivariable ordinal logistic regression models were built using MultiLogistic SAS macro (available at http://sydney.edu.au/vetsci/biostat/macros/) with a manual forward stepwise approach. Variables significantly (p-value<0.05) associated with the outcome were retained in the final model. All variables eligible for multivariable analyses were retested by adding them one-at-a-time to the final model and measuring for changes in regression coefficients. The gender and age of the managers were considered as a priori confounders and forced into all models. All biologically meaningful two-way interactions of the variables in the final model were tested for significance (p<0.05). To assess the effect of clustering of observations from the same region, a regional cluster-level random effect term was added to the final model after excluding the fixed effect term for regional cluster. Potential interviewer bias was assessed by addition of an interviewer-level random effect term to the final model (Hox, 1994) . Intra-class correlation (ICC) was then calculated for each random effect (Dohoo, 2009 ). The proportional odds assumption of the cumulative logit model was tested by the score test (Clark, 2005) . To assess model fit the Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-square statistics were evaluated.
Content analysis of comments regarding positive and negative aspects of the outbreak management
Besides asking horse managers to rate the outbreak management on an ordinal scale, managers were asked two other questions: (a) "What do you think were the strengths of the outbreak management?" and (b) "What do you think could have been done to manage the situation better?". The answers to these questions were recorded (with managers' consent), transcribed and read three times to ensure familiarity prior to coding. If consent for recording was not given, the interviewer made detailed notes which were also read three times prior to coding. Managers who consented and who did not consent to recordings were compared by their age and gender distribution using a Z-test of binomial proportions. Content analyses of the qualitative data used an 'interpretive' coding procedure, driven by the data itself and not by pre-determined categories (Franzosi, 2004) . Responses could include comments that fitted into multiple theme categories. The set of categories proposed by the lead author was subsequently used by another analyst to code the data, allowing for comparison of results of the two independent analysts. The level of agreement between the two analysts, and hence the reliability of results, was assessed using Cohen's Kappa statistic and Prevalence Adjusted and Bias Adjusted Kappa (PABAK) using Kappa Program SAS macro (Cunningham, 2009 ).
The frequency distributions of the comment categories as rated by the lead author were classified by the outbreak management rating outcome. To further analyse these comment themes, univariable and multivariable binary logistic regression analyses were conducted with the outcome being whether the manager did/did not mention a specific theme. Only those themes which had a PABAK >0.7 and a frequency >20 were analysed. The binary outcome variable in each analysis was determined by whether horse mangers mentioned or did not mention 'Good communications', 'Achieved successful eradication', 'Effective movement restrictions and quarantine', 'Effective zoning' and 'Good veterinary support' as strengths. For areas of improvement, whether the following themes were mentioned or not were analysed: 'Inequality of treatment in financial and vaccine allocation', 'Lack of resources', 'Poor horse event management early in the outbreak' and 'Poor enforcement'. The same explanatory variables used in ordinal logistic regression analyses described earlier (Table 1) were tested in binary logistic regression analyses using the same approach as described above.
Results
Two-thirds of the managers were female and the majority (74%) were middle-aged (35-54 years old); 11% and 15% were <35 years and >54 years, respectively. Nearly half (47%) of the interviewees managed horses on small acreage premises, and 18% each held horses at a horse or rider training facility or on a farm with commercial livestock or cropping enterprises. Of the remainder, 9% managed horses on premises comprising a commercial horse breeding enterprise and 8% were placed at an agistment premises where horses of multiple owners are kept together.
Of the 200 horse managers interviewed, three were unsure about how to rate the outbreak management whilst one declined to answer the question due to employment with an associated government department at the time of the outbreak. Of the remaining 196 managers, 7% considered that the NSW DPI managed the outbreak 'very well', 33% considered it 'well', 40% deemed it 'okay', whilst 12% and 8% considered that the outbreak response was managed 'poorly' or 'very poorly', respectively.
Contingency tables for 12 explanatory variables associated (p≤0.20) with the 'rating of outbreak management' in univariable analyses are presented in Table 2 . Neither premises infection status during the 2007 outbreak (p=0.644) nor location of the premises within a specific outbreak control zone (P=0.990) was associated with managers' ratings of outbreak management. Also, specific infection control information sources or media types used during the outbreak were not significantly (range: p=0.155 to p=0.879) associated with horse managers' perception of outbreak management.
Of the 12 variables significantly associated with outbreak management rating in univariable analyses, no pairs displayed high collinearity and no variable had >10% missing observations. Therefore, all 12 variables were made available for inclusion in the multivariable ordinal logistic regression models. Six variables were retained in the final model (Table 3 ). The rating of outbreak management was significantly different across different premises types after adjusting for other variables in the final model (Table 3) . Managers of commercial horse studs were 11 times less likely to consider the outbreak well managed than those on small acreage premises. Being involved in horse competition/sporting events was associated with being less likely to perceive the outbreak as well managed. Those managers who considered another Australian equine influenza outbreak as highly likely in the next five years were three times less likely to rate the outbreak response as well managed compared to those who believed another outbreak was unlikely or not at all likely. Horse managers with horses located in the Hunter Valley and Central Coast geographic regions rated the outbreak as better managed than those in North-West Sydney. There were no differences in the rating of outbreak management between men or women, or among different age groups, yet these two variables were forced into the final model as a priori confounders. Including gender substantially altered parameter estimates by more than 30% for training facility premises type (increased) and the Northern NSW region (decreased). None of the two-way interaction terms between variables in the final model were significantly associated with the outcome variable. Grouping of responses by region accounted for only 5% of the variation (ICC), hence using a mixed model with a random effect for regional cluster instead of a fixed term was considered unnecessary. ICC for clustering of responses according to interviewer was effectively zero.
The score test for the proportional odds assumption was non-significant (p=0.160), indicating that the cumulative logit model was appropriate for the final model (Scott, 1997 ). The final model displayed good fit to the observed data (Deviance goodness-of-fit p=0.34, Pearson goodness-of-fit p=0.104).
Content analysis of comments regarding the NSW DPI outbreak management
A total of 171 managers commented on the strengths of the outbreak management and 185 managers commented on its weaknesses. Of those, 154 managers agreed to have their responses digitally recorded during the face-to-face interview. Age and gender distributions between those recorded (n= 154) and those non-recorded (n=46) were compared but were not significantly different (p = 0.050 and p=0.138 respectively). Examination of agreement between the ratings made by the two independent analysts showed fair to substantial agreement using Kappa, but substantial agreement using PABAK (Tables 4 and 5 ). Broad thematic categories for comments regarding the strength of the NSW DPI outbreak response and suggestions for improvement are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The most frequent comments regarding the strengths of the outbreak management were made about good communication efforts (30%), the successful eradication of the disease (28%) and good support provided to horse managers by the NSW DPI (22%). Three managers provided the following positive comments:
"They were very understanding, very helpful and very easy to deal with.... They were verycongenial in how they handled it." "I think the information that came out on the internet was really useful...we could look at it on a daily basis and see what was going on." "I didn't have any complaints really with anything... I think it was a really difficult thing to know how to handle and ultimately they succeeded."
In addition to the categories included in Table 4 , a few of the 171 managers stated that nothing was well done during the response (2%) or that the disease response was unnecessary and wasted financial resources and that the disease should have been allowed to spread naturally with ongoing vaccination (4%).
Weaknesses most frequently identified by managers were poor or inconsistent communication (40%), inefficiency on behalf of NSW DPI such as perceived unpreparedness, poor staff training and poor internal communication (31%) and inequality of financial compensation and vaccine allocation and distribution (23%) ( Table 5 ). Perceived response inefficiencies are reflected in the following statement:
"They were a little bit slow on quarantining the property and putting the tape up...."
Poor communication was expressed by two other horse managers:
"You need one person that you can contact...We got bounced from one to another to another to another, some were helpful, and ... some could not answer any horse-based questions." "I think it would have been good if we all could have gone to the same spot to get the same information. There was that many people giving you informationit was just a bit overwhelming really."
A general sense of resentment towards government due to the original quarantine breach that lead to the outbreak (Callinan, 2008) was evident in some responses as shown in this comment: "Everyone's really annoyed because you know we had vet bills that of course nobody paid for yet we weren't the ones who went slack in the Quarantine department."
Additionally to the categories in Table 5 , 13% of the 185 managers stated that there was nothing that could have been done better or in addition to what was done.
Detailed investigation of the comment theme categories with n>20 and PABAK >0.7 revealed no associations between explanatory variables and comments regarding 'Good communication', 'Inequality in financial and vaccine resource allocation' and 'Poor horse event management early in the outbreak'. Statistically significant associations for the other six eligible comment themes are presented in Table 6 .
Discussion
The vast majority (80%) of horse managers rated the State government outbreak response positively. Some reasons for these positive perceptions lie in the qualitative feedback about good communication efforts (30%), the overall achievement of successful eradication (28%) and good support provided to horse managers by the NSW DPI (22%). Extensive communication efforts were undertaken by the NSW DPI including information provided on their website, via the telephone call centre, through public meetings and through industry liaison officers (Hoare, 2011, Hoare and Paxton, 2011) . In addition both affected state's authorities had centres providing information, decontamination kits and other support to horse owners such as help in applying for government assistance (Webster, 2011) . At the time of the outbreak, State animal health authorities found that the horse racing and thoroughbred breeding sectors were well regulated and represented, yet other industry sectors did not have highly developed structures and were not represented. This resulted in the development of State crisis bodies to represent the entire non-racing/non-thoroughbred breeding industry (e.g. ministerial task force in NSW; Performance and Pleasure Horse Industry Crisis Committee in Queensland) (Glanville and Christie, 2011) . The large proportion of managers satisfied with the response in this study may reflect the State government's immense efforts to reach, support and collaborate with all industry sectors.
The ultimate successful eradication of equine influenza may be a reason for strong support for future equine influenza control noted in previous research (AHIC, 2008) . This may be particularly true for managers who believed their horses became infected by wind (Table 6) , who may have a greater appreciation of the difficulties of the outbreak response (such as the local area spread of the virus up to five kilometres) (Firestone et al., 2011a) .
Another reason for mostly positive ratings may be Australian animal health authorities' preparedness: a national technical response plan for equine influenza existed prior to 2007 (AHA, 2011) and a simulation outbreak exercise ('Exercise Pegasus') was conducted in the state of Victoria in 2005 (Horse Alert Victoria, 2006) . A pre-existing cost sharing agreement was used during the 2007 Australian outbreak of equine influenza. However, not all equine industry sectors were signatories at the time. Since the 2007 outbreak, a cost-sharing agreement has been signed by representative groups of the equine industry, contributing to future exotic equine disease outbreak preparedness (AHA, 2011).
Despite large proportions of horse managers acknowledging the successful eradication of equine influenza as a strength and specifically mentioning 'Good communication' and 'Good DPI support', negative comments were also made about 'Poor communication', 'DPI inefficiency' and 'Inequality of treatment'. The fact that similar issues were mentioned as both strengths and weaknesses may be explained by a perception of inconsistent delivery of communications and support during the response, through differing frequency of information access by horse managers or through different control regulations in different control zones affecting managers differently. Analysis of themes in this study revealed that managers from the special restricted zone were more likely to comment positively on veterinary support and less likely to note 'Lack of resources' than their counterparts in the restricted zone. Similarly, managers receiving infection control information via the internet were less likely to mention 'Lack of resources' as an area for improvement. The findings of poor communication as a weakness in this study are consistent with the results of another study (Hoare, 2011) . These findings are also consistent with the infectious disease outbreak communication recommendations and guidelines (Barclay, 2005 , Dixon, 2002 , WHO, 2008 that list a need for easily accessible, accurate and consistent information on disease progression and control measures/restrictions to avoid development of stress, anger and distrust towards officials (Dixon, 2002) and non-compliance with regulations (Barclay, 2005) .
The scale of the 2007 equine influenza outbreak was unprecedented in Australia, and authorities were initially overwhelmed by the true crisis rather than emergency nature of this outbreak (Glanville and Christie, 2011) . Despite this, the NSW DPI responded with flexibility and changes to its quarantine and zoning strategy (EI EISG, 2008 , Scott-Orr, 2011 . Although this response was invaluable for the overall successful eradication campaign and for ensuring business continuity within the special restricted area (Scott-Orr, 2011) , the introduction and alterations of zoning and the changing movement regulations had to be communicated. Changing messages may have contributed to confusion among some managers who only intermittently checked for information.
Government inefficiencies were also noted by horse managers, with respect to early outbreak management. Noted inefficiencies included lack of preparedness/planning, poor staff training and poor documentation of contact with horse managers and the lack of a common information system, particularly in the early outbreak period. Australian animal health authorities were financially and technically well prepared for the equine influenza outbreak through an existing cost-sharing agreement and disease response plan, maintained by Animal Health Australia (AHA). AHA is a notfor-profit public company, established by the Australian government, state and territory governments and major national livestock industry organisations, which provides emergency animal disease training programs for veterinarians and other personnel in Australian livestock industries and maintains a rapid response team to ensure a pool of trained personnel (AHA, 2011). Such personnel was utilised during the equine influenza response (Webster, 2011 ). Yet, additional human resources to those trained and maintained by AHA are required during a major exotic disease incursion, but limited financial resources may not allow maintenance of such extra resources during times of absence of disease. Finite resources potentially explain complaints about insufficient staff numbers or sub-optimally trained staff operating during the outbreak response. Comments about the poor hygiene and biosecurity practices of veterinarians during the control response made by horse owners have also been discussed in another study (Schemann et al., 2011) . A socio-psychological study investigating the limitations of reporting of clinical suspect classical swine fever cases in the Netherlands found that poor staff training and field practices, including hygiene, contributed to mistrust in government and formed a barrier to disease reporting (Elbers et al., 2010) .
Negative views of outbreak management in this study may also be associated with blaming the government for the epidemic based on a perception of inadequate border quarantine control (as shown in some comments). This relationship was not further investigated in this study; however, it was noted that many horse managers considered the NSW DPI (a State agency) as equivalent to the federal quarantine service responsible for the quarantine station located in Western Sydney. This perceived association may have greatly contributed to government distrust and should be considered for further research. Association of the perceived increased likelihood of a future equine influenza outbreak within the next five years with poorer outbreak management probably also reflects distrust in the federal government quarantine service to prevent future incursions, a lack of trust in the disease's successful eradication or a misconception that equine influenza was not successfully eradicated.
Commercial stud mangers were 11 times more likely to rate the outbreak response poorer than managers on small acreage homes with horses onsite, but there were no differences among small acreage homes and other enterprise types. This finding is perhaps best explained by the timing of the 2007 outbreak, which occurred in spring, corresponding with the natural breeding season of the mare. Most commercial stud breeders rely on mares travelling to the stud for breeding services at this time of the year. These movements were halted by disease control restrictions, resulting in loss of breeding opportunities. Restrictions also translated into fewer of the highly sought after thoroughbred stallions being imported for the southern hemisphere breeding season in 2007/2008 (half as many as in 2006/2007) and reductions in thoroughbred exports (Australian Racing Board, 2009) . Stud managers are more likely to have been involved with horse importation/exportation. Their perceptions of the biosecurity measures applied at the Sydney quarantine facility leading up to the outbreak (Callinan, 2008) may have formed their view of the response effort. Together with the impacts of the global financial crisis, the equine influenza outbreak had follow-on effects on prices at yearling sales in 2008/2009: the average price at the major yearling sales was reduced by 32% compared to the previous year (Australian Racing Board, 2009 ). Long-term disruption and impact to business enterprises might be reasons for stud managers to view the outbreak more negatively in retrospect, despite substantial efforts made by federal and state authorities during the outbreak to specifically reduce impacts on commercial horse industries (via implementation of a new and innovative riskbased restriction zoning policy and tailored vaccination implementation to target their industries first (Arthur and Suann, 2011, Scott-Orr, 2011) .
The disease control movement restrictions applied in NSW from late August 2007 until 14 March 2008, impacted on equestrian competitions similar to breeding resulting in cancellations and restrictions during that period (Arthur and Suann, 2011, Bell and Drury-Klein, 2011) . Many competitors at the semi-professional end of the spectrum did not just miss out on special event qualifications, lost competition points and prize money, but also suffered social impacts: many view sporting events as an opportunity to socialise with like-minded people (Hoare, 2011) .
The region in which a horse premises was located was important: the managers in the Hunter Valley and Central Coast areas were more likely to rate the outbreak response positively compared to those in North-West Sydney. This result may possibly be explained by the high horse density and rates of equine influenza infection experienced in North-West Sydney (EI EISG, 2008 , Scott-Orr, 2011 . Similarly, South-West Sydney is characterised by higher horse density possible resulting in similar views of managers from North-West Sydney and South-West Sydney. In comparison, the Northern NSW region is characterised by larger parcels of land, reducing horse density, yet in this region there was a lot of dispersion of equine influenza via horse movements immediately prior to the national standstill being implemented , potentially resulting in related poorer perceptions of the overall management of early implementation of movement restrictions at a horse event. Additionally purposeful spreading of the virus was anecdotally reported from that area, which may have been captured in further analyses of themes in this study finding that 'Poor enforcement' was more frequently mentioned by men and participants in rodeo-style horse events, both more typical of rural farming areas such as Northern NSW.
Despite an overall low level of under-reporting of 1.2% during the outbreak and <1% in Sydney South, higher levels occurred in certain areas including Northern NSW (Dhand and Sergeant, 2011) . Underreporting associated with distrust may have occurred in this area because of negative experiences. Lack of trust in government agencies is recognised as a key factor adversely influencing animal disease reporting behaviour of farmers (Palmer et al., 2009 ) as well as their compliance with recommended disease control measures (Barclay, 2005) . Negative experiences during the 2007 incursion may have resulted in distrust in government agencies and could have consequences for future outbreak management.
This study had several strength and weaknesses, which are inherent in epidemiological studies conducted using questionnaires. To reduce potential misclassification bias arising from the subjective nature of the outcome and explanatory variables, only closed categorical responses were allowed. Many questions included a "don't know" option to reduce interviewees selecting an answer at random. In addition face-to-face administration was chosen to increase cooperation, rapport, consistency and reliability of the responses as well as completeness of data. To improve recall of the time of the 2007 outbreak, open discussion of managers situation during the outbreak led up to questioning; however some degree of recall bias is possible. Another potential source of bias, confounding, was addressed in this study by adjusting models for a priori confounders and assessing their effects. Potential interviewer bias (clustering of responses by interviewer) was assessed, but the ICC was effectively zero, indicating absence of measurable interviewer bias. Further analyses of themes mentioned by logistic regression was limited to 'theme mentioned'/'theme not mentioned' because in the interview managers were not specifically asked about each theme. Despite this limitation, unprompted mentioning of a theme indicates a strong recollection, which can be expected to be strongly linked to overall outbreak management rating. Using two independent analysts to code the data and comparing the categorisation using Cohen's Kappa and PABAK and further analyses of only those themes with strong agreement (BAPAK>0.7) adds to repeatability and reliability of the results.
In conclusion, the majority of horse managers rated the outbreak management positively. Horse stud managers, competitors at equestrian and other horse events, and people feeling vulnerable to a future equine influenza outbreak were more likely to rate the 2007 equine influenza outbreak as poorly managed by State government animal disease authorities. It is recommended that outbreak communications and outbreak information systems as well as staff training be reviewed to promote trust and compliance with future outbreak regulations.
Figure 1: Location of premises included in a study of horse owners/managers in New South
Wales, Australia, affected by equine influenza control measures in 2007. The special restricted equine influenza control zone is indicated by shading. .
Sources of infection control information during the outbreak
Internet; General media (television, newspaper, radio); Other horse owners; Veterinarians; Other horse professionals (farriers, dentists, chiropractors, trainers, coaches); Australian Horse Industry Council; State Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI); Association/society (breed, sporting); Horse equipment or feed retailer. c Continuous variable; d Equestrian events include dressage, showjumping, eventing, and endurance. Competition/sporting events include horse showing, pony-club, rodeo-style, polo, equestrian and/or racing. Rodeo-style horse events include camp-drafting, cutting and barrel-racing; e Agistment is the keeping of other owner's horses for remuneration, whilst spelling is resting horses on pasture. Odds ratios are based on cumulative logit model and compare the odds of better management versus poorer management ('well' versus 'adequately and poor'; or 'well and adequately' versus 'poor'). For example, the odds ratio of 1.94 for the variable 'Horses kept only for recreation' indicates that owners who keep horses only for recreation are 1.94 times more likely to perceive that the outbreak was managed well than those who don't keep horses only for recreation. 6 (3.5%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 0.74 (0.50, 0.98) 0.95 a Cohen's Kappa and BAPAK are measuring the agreement between two independent analysts using the same nine comment classifications. Only the classifications made by one of the two analysts are reported as total (n=171) frequencies and for the frequencies by the outcome 'Outbreak management rating'. The measure can be interpreted as follows: <0.00 = poor; 0.00-0.20 = slight; 0.21-0.40 = fair; 0.41-0.60 = moderate; 0.61-0.80 = substantial and 0.81-1.00 = almost perfect (Cunningham, 2009 ). b BAPAK = Bias Adjusted Prevalence Adjusted Kappa (Cunningham, 2009 ). 11 (5.9%) 5 (45.5%) 5 (45.5%) 1 (9.0%) 0.56 (0.33, 0.79) 0.88 a Cohen's Kappa and BAPAK are measuring the agreement between two independent analysts using the same nine comment classifications. Only the classifications made by one of the two analysts are reported as total (n=185) frequencies and for the frequencies by the outcome 'Outbreak management rating'. The measure can be interpreted as follows: <0.00 = poor; 0.00-0.20 = slight; 0.21-0.40 = fair; 0.41-0.60 = moderate; 0.61-0.80 = substantial and 0.81-1.00 = almost perfect (Cunningham, 2009 ). b BAPAK = Bias Adjusted Prevalence Adjusted Kappa (Cunningham, 2009 ). 
Outbreak experience and perceptions
